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I INTRODUCTION 
Bills of rights are generally considered to apply only to the state and not as 
between private individuals. This is understandable since they were traditionally 
designed as defensive rights of the citizen limiting the powers of the state. 1 When 
looking at section 3 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 ("the Bill of 
Rights Act") which provides that 
"[t]his Bill of Rights applies only to acts done- (emphasis added) 
(a) by the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the government of New 
Zealand; or 
(b) by any person or body in the performance of any public function, power, or 
duty conferred or imposed on that person or body by or pursuant to law" 
the wording leaves no doubt that the Bill of Rights Act does not - at least 
not directly - apply to any act done by a person in private capacity .2 
Consequently, it does not render unlawful acts of private individuals which would 
be in breach of the Bill of Rights Act if they had been done by someone acting in 
public capacity. As such, the Bill of Rights Act does not create any duties or 
obligations for individuals acting in private capacity.3 During the third reading of 
the Bill of Rights Act, the then Prime Minister made it plain that " [ c ]itizens will 
not be able to invoke its provisions to sue one another".4 
This, however, does not (and arguably should not) necessarily mean that 
fundamental rights and freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights Act are irrelevant 
to private relationships. While some rights - quite apart from section 3 - by their 
very nature solely speak to the state, for example the rights to certain minimum 
standards of criminal procedure contained in section 25 of the Bill of Rights Act, 
other guarantees such as the section 19 right to freedom from discrimination could 
conceptually also be invoked against private individuals. Considering the 
See A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper (House of Representatives, Wellington, 
1985) AJHR - A6, para I 0.20; Paul Rishworth, Grant Huscroft, Scott Optican, Richard 
Mahoney The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2003), 113 ; see 
also living Word Distributors Ltd v Human Rights Action Group [2000] 3 NZLR 570, 584 
("The Bill of Rights is a limitation on governmental, not private conduct."). 
2 
Contrast, for example, Article 8(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa which 
expressly provides that fundamental rights may apply directly as between private actors: "A 
provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is 
applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by 
the right." 
3 
See Paul Rish worth and ors, above n I, l 08-109 . 
4 
Rt Hon Geoffrey Palmer ( 14 August 1990) 510 NZPD 3450. 
worldwide political trend towards privatisation, factual power to interfere with 
civil rights and liberties has become increasingly concentrated in private hands.5 
In 1971, Peter Archer MP speaking in the House of Commons succinctly pointed 
out that6 
"there are other relationships, not only relationships between the individual and 
government, which can also blight lives, and which for many individuals can 
result in tragedy. Very serious distress can be caused by an employer, by a 
landlord, or by a neighbour. Not all wrecked lives are caused by governments." 
This list is certainly not exhaustive. One might be inclined to add, at least, 
the media and the bank sector. 7 It is therefore not surprising that the historical 
concept of fundamental rights and freedoms, their applicability and protection has 
been equally increasingly called into question. Over the years, especially since the 
passage of the United Kingdom's Human Rights Act 1998 which incorporated the 
guarantees of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms8, a debate has developed about the proper effect of human 
rights on private relationships, and the appropriate role of the courts in protecting 
fundamental values against the exercise of private power. Under the general term 
of "horizontal effect" or "horizontal application", a wide spectrum of nuanced 
positions has emerged both in the academic9 as well as the judicial10 arena. 
5 Murray Hunt "Human Rights and the Public-Private Distinction" in Grant Huscroft and Paul 
Rishworth (eds) Litigating Rights: Perspectives from Domestic and International Law (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2002) 7 I ; Gavin Philippson "The Human Rights Act, 'Horizontal Effect' 
and the Common Law: a Bang or a Whimper?" ( 1999) 62 MLR 824, 847. 
6 Peter Archer MP (2 April 1971) H.C. Debs. cols 1861-1862. 
7 Compare Gavin Phillipson, above n 5, 847; Mark Tushnet "The Issue of State Action / 
Horizontal Effect in Comparative Constitutional Law" (2003) 1 Int'l J. Const. L. 79. 
8 (4 November 1950) 213 UNTS 221, ETS 5 (1993). 
9 Nicholas Bamforth "The True 'Horizontal Effect' of the Human Rights Act 1998" (2001) 117 
LQR 34; Deryck Beyleveld and Shaun D Pattinson "Horizontal Applicability and Horizontal 
Effect" (2002) 118 LQR 623 ; Andrew J Bowen "Fundamental Rights in Private Law" (2000) 
20 SLT 157; Richard Buxton "The Human Rights Act and Private Law" (2000) I 16 LQR 48; 
Christoph B Graber and Gunther Teubner "Art and Money : Consitutional Rights in the Private 
Sphere?" ( I 998) I 8 OxJLS 6 I; Ivan Hare "Verticality Challenged: Private Parties, Privacy and 
the Human Rights Act" [200 I] EHRLR 526; Murray Hunt "The 'Horizontal Effect' of the 
Human Rights Act" [1998) PL 423; Antony Lester and David Pannick "The Impact of the 
Human Rights Act on Private Law: the Knight's Move" (2000) I 16 LQR 380; Ian Loveland 
"The Horizontal Direct Effect of the Human Rights Act" (2000) 150 NLJ No 6957, 1595; 
Dawn Oliver "The Human Rights Act and Public/Private Law Divides" [2000) EHRLR 343; 
Gavin Philippson, above n 5; Thomas Raphael "The Problem of Horizontal Effect" [2000) 
EHRLR 493; H WR Wade "Horizons ofHorizontality" (2000) 116 LQR 217. 
10 Venables and Thompson v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001) 1 All ER 908, [2001) 2 WLR 
1038 (Fam D); Douglas and Zeta Jones and Ors v Hello! Ltd [2001] QB 967 (CA); Douglas 
and Zeta Jones and Ors v Hello! Ltd [2003] EWHC 786 (Ch); Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 
UKHL 22 (HL). 
2 
The question of horizontality is, of course, not confined to the United 
Kingdom. While other jurisdictions such as the United States", Germany
12 and 
Canada13 all have largely settled the issue in favour of at least some form of 
consideration to be given to fundamental rights and freedoms even in private 
litigation, the situation in New Zealand - fifteen years after the Bill of Rights Act 
has come into force - still appears to be somewhat hazy. Even though the issue 
has arisen in a number of cases, 
14 it has only been resolved to a certain degree, 
mainly in relation to the question whether the (private) common law is in general 
susceptible to Bill of Rights scrutiny .
15 
Maybe influenced by the controversial discussions surrounding the United 
Kingdom's Human Rights Act, horizontality in New Zealand continues be a 
constitutional can of worms. In last year's judgment of the Court of Appeal in 
Hosking v Runting - an action brought by a TV presenter to enjoin a press 
photographer from taking (and publishing) pictures of his children in the street -
Gault J preferred to decide the matter "[ w ]ithout addressing the complex question 
of the extent to which the Courts are to give effect to the rights and freedoms 
affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act in disputes between private litigants."
16 
11 The leading decisions of the US Supreme Court on the issue of horizontality are Shelley v 
Kraemer (1947) 334 US 1 and New York Times Co v Sullivan ( 1964) 376 US 254. For a further 
instructive description and critical appraisal of the US "state action doctrine" see Andrew S 
Butler, "Constitutional Rights in Private Litigation: a Critique and Comparative Analysis" 
(1993) 22 Anglo-Am. L. Rev. I ; Stephen Gardbaum "The 'Horizontal Effect' of Constitutional 
Rights" (2003) 102 Mich. L. Rev. 387; and Mark Tushnet, above n 7. 
12 The 1958 Luth decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court, (1958) 7 BVerfGE 198, 
English translation available at <http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/global_ law/german-
cases/cases_bverg.shtml? 15jan I 958> (last accessed 30 May 2005), which established the 
doctrine of "mittelbare Drittwirkung" (indirect horizontal effect), has been followed to date 
and remains the high water mark for the application of fundamental rights in private litigation. 
See also Tilman Ulrich Amelung "Damage A wards for Infringement of Privacy - The German 
Approach" (1999) 14 Tul. Eur. & Civ. L. F. 15; Ralf Brinktrine "The Horizontal Effect of 
Human Rights in German Constitutional Law: the British Debate on Horizontality and the 
Possible Role Model of the German Doctrine of Mittelbare Drittwirkung der Grundrechte" 
[2001) EHRLR 421 ; and Basil S Markesinis "Privacy, Freedom of Expression, and the 
Horizontal Effect of the Human Rights Bill: Lessons from Germany" ( 1999) 115 LQR 47. 
13 Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union v Dolphin Delivery Ltd [ 1986] 2 SCR 573 
(SCC); Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada ( 4ed, Carswell, Scarborough, 1997), para 
34.2(g); Ian Leigh "Horizontal Rights, The Human Rights Act and Privacy: Lessons from the 
Commonwealth" (1999) 48 ICLQ 57, 62-66. 
14 See, for example, R v H [1994] 2 NZLR 143 (CA); Television New Zealand v Newsmonitor 
Services Ltd [ 1994] 2 NZLR 91 (HC); Duff v Communicado [ 1996) 2 NZLR 89 (HC); Lange v 
Atkinson and Australian Consolidated Press NZ Ltd [1997] 2 NZLR 22 (HC); [1998] 3 NZLR 
424 (CA); R v N [ 1999] I NZLR 713 (CA); Hosking v Runting [2005] I NZLR I (CA). 
15 Lange v Atkinson and Australian Consolidated Press NZ Ltd, above n 14; Simpson v Attorney-
General [Baigent 's Case} [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA); see also Andrew S Butler "The New 
Zealand Bill of Rights and Private Common Law Litigation" '{1991 )" NZLJ 261; Paul 
Rishworth and ors, above n I, I 00-108. 
16 Hosking v Runting, above n 14, 31, para 114. 
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Hosking v Runting, alongside a series of other recent cases both in New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom, shows that the role of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in inter-private relations might be a complex, but far from 
purely academic question. Should a supermodel on privacy grounds be safe from 
having a photograph of her leaving Narcotics Anonymous published in a tabloid 
newspaperi 7 Can an airline company submit its employees to random drug and 
alcohol tests?18 Should a same-sex partner qualify as a member of a tenant's 
"family" to be entitled to succeed to an assured tenancy?
19 These questions fall 
into the same category as earlier disputes where, for example, parents rejected the 
administration of blood transfusions to their child based on religious belief,
20 a or 
where a news magazine relied on the right to freedom of expression in a 
defamation lawsuit brought by a former Prime Minister.2
1 
This paper will attempt to somewhat untangle the complexity that Gault J 
was so wary of. It will not be able to give definitive solutions for each and every 
set of circumstances in which the question of horizontal application of the Bill of 
Rights Act might arise. It can, however, try to highlight a framework of principles 
which might offer guidance to those who will be called upon to find and formulate 
such solutions. 
By sketching the theoretical background for applying fundamental 
guarantees as between private individuals (including those with legal 
personality22), the paper will clarify some general misconceptions amongst 
commentators and courts which seem to add greatly to the perceived level of 
complexity. These include, for example, the focus of the debate primarily on the 
effect of the Bill of Rights on the common law, and the range of contradictory 
conclusions that are drawn by distinguishing public from private law, common 
from statutory law, and primary from subordinate legislation. While all of these 
attributes are relevant for determining the proper reach of fundamental guarantees 
in private relations, none of the distinctions are by themselves capable of 
providing a comprehensive answer. 
17 Campbell v MGM Ltd, above n I 0. 
18 NZ Amalgamated Engineering Printing & Manufacturing Union Inc. v Air New Zealand Ltd 
(2004) 7 NZELC 97, 367; (2004) 7 HRNZ 539 (Emp Ct). 
19 Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd [ 1999) 3 WLR 1113 (HL). 
20 Re J [ 1996] 2 NZLR 134. 
21 Lange v Atkinson and Australian Consolidated Press NZ Ltd, above n 14. 
22 See New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 29. 
4 
Instead, the paper will suggest that a first, primary distinction must be made 
according to the way in which the Bill of Rights is relied upon in private litigation 
- whether as a 'shield' to defend certain actions or as a 'sword' to actively claim 
something from another private individual. Following this 'shield & sword' 
dichotomy, the extent to which the Bill of Rights may affect the outcome will then 
be analysed in each of the two situations. 
II THEORETICAL BACKGROUND FOR USING BILLS OF RIGHTS AS 
BETWEEN PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS 
As has been mentioned above, the Bill of Rights Act does not impose any 
duties on private individuals - or, more precisely, on individuals in their private 
capacity. Section 3(b) of the Bill of Rights Act shows that private individuals can 
in fact be directly bound by Bill of Rights guarantees if only they are performing a 
public function, power or duty conferred upon them by or pursuant to law. 
Conversely, if there is no such qualifying public element attached to either 
individual, the Bill of Rights Act does not apply - to them. This is probably what 
the Court of Appeal in R v H had in mind when stating that "wholly private 
conduct is left to be controlled by the general law of the land. "23 
The deciding factor for triggering section 3 is, of course, not so much 
whether the conduct takes place (wholly) in private or public, but rather whether it 
can be attributed to a public function, power or duty.24 Nevertheless, the Court's 
obiter comment contains an important starting point for the problem of 
horizontality: While the Bill of Rights Act may not apply to private individuals 
acting outside public functions, powers or duties, there remains the controlling 
"general law of the land" as well as a judicial system of courts and tribunals 
entrusted with its interpretation and application. Both of them seem to fall 
squarely into the public realm, which opens up the question to what extent they 
may be subject to the Bill of Rights Act and thereby import fundamental rights 
and freedoms into an otherwise "private" relationship. The following two sections 
23 RvH[l994)2NZLR 143,147. 
24 This paper will not address the multiple problems surrounding the question of when a non-
governmental person or entity can be seen as performing a public function, power or duty 
within the meaning of section 3(b) of the Bill of Rights Act; see Paul Rishworth and ors, above 
n I, 89 for a discussion. Instead, it will focus on the role and effect which the Bill of Rights Act 
may have on such individuals that indisputably do not come within the ambit of section 3. 
5 
will therefore discuss these secondary connecting factors for the Bill of Rights Act 
in private litigation. 
A The Law as an Intermediary for Fundamental Rights and Free,loms in 
Private Relationships 
Law structures relationships between different entities by setting out 
systems of rights and duties, privileges and responsibilities, liberties and 
restrictions, all based on certain policy considerations. Taking into account the 
respective character of the entities involved on either side (public
25 or private), 
these relationships can be divided into three groups: First, the "public/public" 
group comprising relationships between two or more public entities (for example, 
local government bodies vis-a-vis the national government); secondly, the 
"public/private" group consisting of all those relationships between public 
authorities and private individuals (for example, the police vis-a-vis a suspected 
criminal, or the Department of Inland Revenue vis-a-vis the taxpayers); and 
finally, the "private/private" group encompassing the vast amount of relationships 
among private individuals themselves (for example, private landlord and tenant, 
private sector employer and employee, neighbours, families, or simply two people 
passing in the street26). It is this last group which is of particular interest for this 
paper, since neither entity will trigger the applicability clause of the Bill of Rights 
Act. 
By providing regulatory frameworks for each of the groups, law as an 
expression of public power itself introduces a "public" element in all of the 
relationships27 - regardless of the nature of the entities concerned. Depending on 
the body which formulates them, such rules can generally be classified as acts of 
the legislative (statutory law), the executive (subordinate legislation) or the 
judicial (common law) branch of government. Broadly speaking, the Bill of 
Rights Act therefore applies to any form of such structuring law. 
While this result is uncontroversial as regards acts done by the legislative 
and executive branch, there has been some debate about whether the common law 
25 Including such persons or bodies envisaged by section 3(b) of the Bill of Rights Act. 
26 Even though there may not be a concrete or individualised relationship between any two 
people such as a work contact or tenancy agreement, the law nevertheless structures their 
relations, for example, by requiring each to observe certain general duties of care, or by 
affording each certain defensive rights against the other. 
27 Murray Hunt, above n 5, 84. 
should at all be susceptible to Bill of Rights scrutiny. The discussion was mainly 
driven by concerns that subjecting the common law to the Bill of Rights Act 
would usurp Parliament's deliberate exclusion of private individuals from 
section 3.28 Although the underlying aim to honour legislative intent is certainly 
commendable, the portrayed risk is no greater regarding the common law than any 
other rule governing the relationship between private individuals. 
Not only are "private law" statutes such as, for example, the Residential 
Tenancies Act 1986 regulating the relationship between landlord and tenant 
clearly "acts done" by the legislature.29 They are also equally subject to section 6 
of the Bill of Rights Act which mandates that whenever possible an enactment 
must be given a meaning consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in the 
Bill of Rights.30 Whether a rule forms part of the common law or can be found in 
a statute book is often entirely fortuitous. It would be a wholly arbitrary 
distinction if only the statutory part of the legal framework within which private 
relations are conducted were subjected to scrutiny for compliance with Bill of 
Rights standards. 31 
Since the legislature, through section 6 of the Bill of Rights Act, obligated 
the courts to interpret - wherever possible - even its own Acts of Parliament 
consistently with the rights and freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights, the 
contention that it intended to preclude the common law from any Bill of Rights 
examination seems far fetched. In addition, the fact that there are not only 
"private" but also "public" common law rules (for example contempt of court
32
) v 
whose susceptibility to the Bill of Rights Act appears to be uncontested,
33 shows 
that issue of subjecting private individuals to Bill of Rights standards cannot be 
equated to the question of applying the Bill of Rights Act to the common law. 
Those wishing to exclude potential influence of the Bill of Rights Act on private 
28 See Paul Rishworth and ors, above n I , 100. 
29 Compare generally Paul Rishworth and ors, above n I, 72 ("The only relevant ' act ' that can be 
' done ' by Parliament, as such, is the passing of legislation ."); see also Mark Tushnet, above 
n 7, 82. 
3° Compare Murray Hunt, above n 5, 84, on the similar interpretation rule in section 3 of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK). 
3 1 Murray Hunt, above n 5, 85; Thomas Raphael, above n 9, 497. 
32 See Solicitor-General v Radio New Zealand Ltd [ l 994) l NZLR 48 (HC, Full Court) and 
discussion by Rishwo1th and ors, above n I , I 05- I 06: "Though the law of contempt was 
common law, it was every bit as public as if there had been a statute conferring the court's 
contempt power." 
33 See Paul Rishworth and ors, above n I, 99: " Where parties bound by the Bill of Rights rely 
upon common law doctrines to justify their allegedly rights-infringing actions, those doctrines 
will need to pass Bill of Rights scrutiny." 
7 
individuals cannot point to any characteristic of the common law in general that 
would convincingly assist their line of argumentation. 
A general susceptibility of the common law to Bill of Rights scrutiny has 
consequently been accepted in a number of New Zealand court decisions. While 
Blanchard J in the 1994 decision of Television New Zealand Ltd v Newsmonitor 
Services Ltd was still sceptical of the view that the effect of section 3 of the Bill of 
Rights Act binding the judiciary was, inter alia, to subject the common law to the 
Bill of Rights,34 two years later he held in Duff v Communicado Ltd that 
"[ c ]ontempt of court, like any other part of the common law, is subject to the Bill 
of Rights by virtue of s 3(a) thereof'
35
. His Honour relied on a decision of the Full 
Court of the High Court in Solicitor-General v Radio New Zealand Ltd, a case 
which also concerned the common law of contempt of court and where it was 
accepted as "common ground that the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
applies to these proceedings as applying to acts done by the judicial branch of the 
Government under s 3(a)" 36 . 
In the meanwhile, also the Court of Appeal had noted in R v H that there 
was "considerable force in the view that the Courts [by virtue of section 3(a) of 
the Bill of Rights Act] should accordingly recognise the Bill of Rights protections 
as and where appropriate in evolving the common law."
37 However, the strongest 
statement in this context was made by Elias J in the High Court decision of Lange 
v Atkinson and Australian Consolidated Press NZ Ltd expressing the view that
38 
"the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act protections are to given effect by the court 
in applying the common law.[ ... ] The application of the Act to the common law 
seems to me to follow from the language of s. 3 which refers to acts of the 
judicial branch of the Government of New Zealand[ ... ]. The New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act l 990 is important contemporary legislation which is directly 
relevant to the policies served by the common law of defamation. It is idle to 
suggest that the common law need not conform to the judgments in such 
legislation." 
34 Television New Zealand Ltd v Newsmonitor Services Ltd, above n 14, 96 : "If it was intended 
that the Bill of Rights is directly to apply in relation to every question of statutory 
interpretation and every other substantive judicial decision Parliament might have been 
expected to so enact in plain terms. [ ... ] [This] would indistinguishably embrace non-statutory 
decision making, eg the granting of an injunction to restrain the dissemination of confidential 
information which was not protected by a statute." 
35 Duff v Communicado Ltd, above n 14, 99. 
36 Solicitor-General v Radio New Zealand Ltd, above n 32, 58. 
37 R v H, above n 23, 147. 
38 Lange v Atkinson and Australian Consolidated Press NZ Ltd, above n 14, 32. 
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It would therefore now seem to be well established that the Bill of Rights 
Act is applicable to the common law.39 If it is then accepted accordingly that any 
form of law governing the relationship between different entities - whether public 
or private - is subject to the Bill of Rights as an act of public power, it becomes 
clear that the potential function of the Bill of Rights in private relations can and 
should be assessed independently of the private nature of the entities concerned. It 
is the law in its various expressions governing the relationship between private 
individuals that, in principle, needs to conform to Bill of Rights standards.40 This 
normative effect41 of the Bill of Rights Act is one of the key elements in 
understanding and determining the proper reach of the Bill of Rights as between 
private individuals. 
B The Role of the Courts in Giving Effect to Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms in Private Relationships 
The other secondary connecting factor for g1vmg effect to fundamental 
rights and freedoms in private relationships can be seen in the involvement of the 
courts whenever disputes between private individuals are actually litigated. The 
express mention of the judicial branch of government in section 3(a) of the Bill of 
Rights Act not only leads to the application of the Bill of Rights Act to the 
common law, but also subjects any court to Bill of Rights directions and 
guarantees in its decision-making process. This is directly apparent in relation to 
section 27(1) of the Bill of Rights Act, which requires courts to observe principles 
of natural justice whenever they "make a determination in respect of [a] person's 
rights, obligations, or interests protected or recognized by law", ie also in civil 
proceedings. Another example already mentioned above would be section 6 of the 
Bill of Rights Act which directs the courts to interpret enactments, if possible, 
consistently with the Bill of Rights - regardless of the nature of the proceedings. 
However, on an even broader basis, any judicial determination made by a 
court will in itself constitute an act done by the judiciary triggering section 3(a) of 
39 Murray Hunt, above n 5, 77; The Laws of New Zealand (LexisNexis NZ, Wellington, 2003) 
Human Rights, para 17 (last updated 15 December 2003) <www.lexisnexis.co.nz>; Paul 
Rishworth and ors; above n I, I 02. 
40 See Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (3) S.A. 850, 914H (Const Ct SA) Kriegler J dissenting; 
Murray Hunt, above 9, 434. 
41 Compare Max Du Plessis and Jolyon Ford "Developing the Common Law Progressively -
Horizontality, the Human Rights Act and the South African Experience" [2004) EHRLR 286, 
290. 
9 
the Bill of Rights Act.42 This conclusion has found scattered objection,43 which, 
however, fails to succeed. 
First, it seems to follow from the natural and ordinary meaning of section 
3(a) of the Bill of Rights Act that the determination of legal disputes is an "[act] 
done by the [ . . . ] judicial branch of government". The fact that judges have 
"opportunities for choice, decision and judgment" demonstrates that their 
decisions are "conscious and deliberate" acts.44 
Secondly, the argument that courts are not acting as a branch of government 
when deciding a case since they are only "applying the Bill of Rights",45 is 
unconvincing. If it were correct, most executive bodies which also "apply" the 
Bill of Rights Act - just as any other Act of Parliament - in their decision-making 
process would fall outside section 3(a). Furthermore, proponents of this argument 
mistakenly rely on the reasoning of the Canadian Supreme Court in Dolphin 
Delivery,46 which held that the issuance of a court decision did not constitute 
governmental action - for the purposes of applying the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.47 The Charter, however, unlike the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act, does not list the judiciary in its applicability section.48 For court 
decisions to come within the ambit of the Charter, they had to be acts of the 
"government". While the Canadian Supreme Court denied the governmental 
nature of court orders - and never questioned their character as "acts" - this issue 
has been resolved by section 3(a) of the Bill of Rights Act itself, which expressly 
considers the judiciary as part of the "government of New Zealand." 
A court's decision is in fact essential for giving the proper effect to 
fundamental rights and freedoms in any legal relationship, since it may contain 
42 The Laws of New Zealand, above n 39, Human Rights , paras 16-17; Andrew Butler, above 
n 15, 261. 
43 See Pau I Rishworth and ors , above n I, l O I. 
44 Andrew Butler, above n 15, 261 . 
45 Paul Rishworth and ors, above n I, IOI . 
46 Paul Rishworth and ors, above n I, IOI- I 02. 
47 Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union v Dolphin Delivery Ltd, above n 13 , 600 (SCC) 
McIntyre J: " While in political science terms it is probably acceptable to treat the courts as one 
of the three fundamental branches of Government, that is, legislative, executive, and judicial, I 
cannot equate for the purposes of Charter application the order of a court with an element of 
governmental action ." (emphasis added). 
48 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 32( I): "This Charter applies (a) to the Parliament 
and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament 
including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories; and (b) to the 
legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the authority of the 
legislature of each province." 
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new elements arising out of the application of the law to the individual facts of the 
case. While some judicial determinations are just of declaratory nature, in essence 
repeating what the law has already decided, others might be based on provisions 
that confer discretionary powers or are simply broadly formulated. 
For example, section 44(3) of the Human Rights Act 1993 deems it 
unlawful for a club to grant privileges to members of other clubs in a way that 
discriminates on prohibited grounds listed in section 21 of the Human Rights Act 
1993. A decision by the Complaint Review Tribunal finding that a club has 
engaged in such activity would add nothing to the limitation of the right to 
freedom of association49 already imposed by section 44(3) of the Human Rights 
Act 1993. As regards this initial limitation, it would be sufficient to scrutinize the 
statutory provision for Bill of Rights compliance, bearing in mind, of course, that 
the conflicting interest of the affected members not to be discriminated against is 
also protected under the Bill of Rights.50 
In contrast, certain general limitations on the right to freedom of expression 
imposed by the Copyright Act 1994 ("restricted acts"
51
) are subject to exceptions 
that use the rather woolly concept of "fair dealing". For example, section 42(2) of 
the Copyright Act 1994 provides that fair dealing with a work for the purposes of 
reporting current events by means of a sound recording, film, broadcast, or cable 
programme does not infringe copyright in the work. The actual limitation of the 
right to freedom of expression in this context thus depends greatly on how a court 
would judge the facts of the case and whether it would come to the conclusion 
that the limit of "fair dealing" has been exceeded. Conversely, it would be 
difficult to make any definitive assessment of the provisions' consistency with the 
Bill of Rights Act in their abstract form. 
Therefore, not only the structuring law, but also its individual application in 
the form of a judicial decision must meet the requirements set out by the Bill of 
Rights Act, again irrespective of the public or private nature of the entities or 
individuals that are party to the litigation. Blanchard J summarized this result in 
49 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 17. 
50 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 19 (Freedom from discrimination); compare also Ian 
Leigh "The UK 's Human Rights Act 1998 : An Early Assessment" in Grant Huscroft and Paul 
Rishworth (eds) litigating Rights: Perspectives from Domestic and International Law (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2002) 323, 338. 
51 See, for example, Copyright Act I 994, s 30: "The copying of a work is a restricted act in 
relation to any description of copyright work." 
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Dujf v Communicado Ltd by describing how the law of contempt of court should 
both in general and as applied in the specific case, ie the individual outcome, be 
tested for consistency with the Bill of Rights:52 
"There are three ways of examining the relationship between the Bill of Rights 
and the law of contempt. First, one could take the whole doctrine of the common 
law of contempt and ' test ' it against the right to freedom of expression. The 
question would then be whether contempt of Court as a doctrine constitutes a 
reasonable limit on the freedom of expression. [ . . . ] 
Or the Court could determine what effect to give to the Bill of Rights guarantee 
on a case-by-case basis, balancing the right to freedom of expression against the 
interference with the administration of justice in the particular case. The question 
would then be whether a determination that there has been a contempt on the 
facts of the particular case would result in a reasonable limit on the freedom of 
expression in those circumstances. 
Thirdly, the Court could do both of these things, which I think is preferable. In as 
far as it involves taking the second approach, it reflects the reality that every case 
of contempt of Court involves balancing the benefits of freedom of expression 
against the benefits of protecting the administration of justice. That balancing is 
best done on the facts of each case, rather than in the abstract. The result of 
adopting the first method is that the ' balancing' process takes place at a high 
level of abstraction. This can misrepresent the true nature of the decision that 
must be made in each case, namely, whether the particular interference with the 
administration of justice is so serious as to warrant overriding the freedom of 
expression. At the same time, there is good reason to assess the doctrine overall 
against the Bill of Rights." 
The decision of the court becomes even more important when there is 
simply no rule - neither statute nor common law - that can be tested for Bill of 
Rights compliance. This will usually be the case where an applicant seeks the 
intervention of the courts in matters that have been left unregulated. Here, the 
court's involvement when called upon by private individuals will be the only act 
of public authority within the meaning of section 3 of the Bill of Rights Act. This 
situation might already foreshadow to a certain degree the different ways in which 
the Bill of Rights can be advanced in private ( as in public) litigation - and that its 
respective level of influence need not necessarily be the same. 
52 Duff v Communicado Ltd, above n 14, 99-100. 
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C The Different Roles of the Bill of Rights Act in Private Litigation - The 
'Shield & Sword' Dichotomy 
In any adversarial judicial proceeding there will be at least two opposing 
parties to the dispute. As for private litigation, one will usually claim something 
from, or assert a right against the other. Since both parties are private individuals, 
each of them could in principle invoke the Bill of Rights - not against their 
respective opponent, but in relation to the applicable law and the court's decision. 
However, considering the traditional role of the Bill of Rights as a collection 
of defensive rights, on a first intuitive approach there would probably seem to be 
room for any Bill of Rights considerations only on the defendant 's side. More 
precisely, the Bill of Rights acts as a "shield" to defend private conduct against 
claims by other private individuals as an exercise of guaranteed fundamental 
rights or freedoms. This should arguably be the least controversial setting of cases 
in which the issue of horizontality arises: for example, a defendant who invokes 
the right to freedom of expression against being held in contempt of court,53 or 
against a claim for damages brought in a private defamation lawsuit. 54 In this 
constellation, one can hardly speak of the private claimant being bound to observe 
the Bill of Rights Act. Since it will be the defendant's actions that give rise to the 
litigation, there is nothing the claimant might have done in conflict with the Bill 
of Rights Act. A (potential) infringement of the defendant's fundamental rights 
and · freedoms only comes into play if the law and/or a court actually impose a 
sanction on such actions to the benefit of the claimant. What is decisive is thus the 
imposition of the sanction as the relevant act of public power susceptible to Bill of 
Rights scrutiny, not the private nature of the claimant. 
The situation becomes less straightforward when the tables are turned. In 
NZ Amalgamated Engineering Printing & Manufacturing Union Inc. v Air New 
Zealand Ltd, it was the claimants - trade unions acting on behalf of its members 
employed by the airline - who (successfully) advanced the right to freedom from 
unreasonable search and seizure55 against the introduction of a random drug test 
policy under the concept of lawful and reasonable employer command.56 The 
53 Dujfv Communicado Ltd, above n 14. 
54 Lange v Atkinson and Australian Consolidated Press NZ Ltd, above n 14. 55 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 21. 
56 NZ Amalgamated Engineering Printing & Manufacturing Union Inc. v Air New Zealand Ltd, above n 18. 
13 
significant difference here lies in the fact that private actions were said to limit 
rights of another private individual under the Bill of Rights Act. 
Using the Bill of Rights as a "sword" to claim something ( damages, specific 
performance, forbearance, etc.) from another private individual seems, at first 
sight, rather unorthodox. This impression is reinforced if one recalls the Prime 
Minister's statement that "citizens will not be able to invoke [Bill of Rights] 
provisions to sue one another". 57 The statement, however, only precludes what is 
commonly referred to as a "direct" or "full" horizontal effect of fundamental 
rights provisions:58 a private individual cannot be taken to court on the sole basis 
that he or she has breached provisions of the Bill of Rights - for the simple reason 
that those provisions do not bind private individuals in the first place. 
Instead, a claimant will have to seek a remedy through the "ordinary" law 
governing the relationships between private individuals. This body of law will 
usually contain causes of action that reflect the principles created or affirmed by 
fundamental rights instruments. 59 Where, however, the reflection of such 
principles in setting out requirements for a remedy appears inadequate, or where a 
court fails to properly consider fundamental rights implications and thereby 
refuses to grant a remedy otherwise available, it remains entirely possible for a 
claimant to demand a Bill of Rights consistent judicial determination. Otherwise, 
the law and/or court decision - both acts of public power - positively authorising 
the defendant's actions would breach the claimant's rights under the Bill of Rights 
Act vis-a-vis the two respective branches of government. 
At this point, it is convenient to remind oneself that the rights and freedoms 
contained in the Bill of Rights are, of course, only guaranteed subject to sections 5 
and 4 of the Bill of Rights Act. The refusal to grant a specific remedy in particular 
circumstances - whether by a court or the regulatory framework itself - may very 
well constitute a "reasonable [limit] prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society".6° For example, as regards non-contact 
57 Rt Hon Geoffrey Palmer, above n 4. 
58 For a proponent of "direct horizontality" (under the UK's Human Rights Act 1998) see H WR 
Wade, above n 9; see also discussion by Murray Hunt, above n 9, 428; and above n 5, 78. 
59 A good example is the Domestic Violence Act 1995 . Whereas a victim of domestic violence 
may not invoke the section 9 right not to be subjected to cruel or degrading treatment directly 
against a violent partner, he or she can make an application for a protection order under Part II 
of the Act whose express purpose it is to ensure effective legal protection for victims of 
physical, sexual or psychological abuse (see Domestic Violence Act 1995, s 5(1)(b)). 
60 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5. 
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protection orders under the Domestic Violence Act 1995, the applicant's interest 
in a restrictive order will generally be in conflict with the defendant's right to 
freedom of movement. 61 Therefore, in order to achieve overall consistency with 
the Bill of Rights Act, both the law governing private relationships as well as the 
individual judicial determination will often have to balance a multiplicity of 
legitimate rights, freedoms or interests. This balancing exercise will usually result 
in private persons being permitted to act in ways that the state could not,62 since 
the state cannot itself rely on the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of 
Rights Act. A certain sphere of private autonomy is thereby preserved. 
Furthermore, it should be emphasized that the function of the Bill of Rights 
Act to support claims against private individuals under existing rules of private 
law does not necessarily depend on interpreting fundamental rights provisions to 
impose so-called "positive obligations" on the state.63 The question whether the 
state has a duty to protect citizens from rights infringing actions by other private 
individuals may become decisive, if the structuring law does not offer any suitable 
cause of action at all - a point that will be discussed below. Where the law does 
provide rules applicable to a dispute, a court must discharge its conventional 
obligations under the Bill of Rights Act to interpret and apply such rules - as far 
as possible - consistently with the guaranteed rights and freedoms of the claimant 
(and, of course, the defendant). There is nothing to suggest that, for example, 
section 6 of the Bill of Rights Act should not apply in these circumstances. Along 
the same lines, the Employment Court in the Air New Zealand case held that64 
"the [Bill of Rights Act] is legislation that [ ... ] is valid to be considered when 
the question for decision is whether an employer's action is reasonable when it 
cuts across fundamental rights recognised by the [Bill of Rights Act]." 
This might actually go one step further than to just require individual acts of 
public power such as a court decision to comply with the Bill of Rights Act. If 
61 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act I 990, s I 8. 
62 Rishworth and ors, above n I, I 02. 
63 Contrast, however, discussion by Rishworth and ors, above n I, 57-60. Antony Lester and 
David Pannick, above n 9, argue that "[the correct approach] involves applying the 
constitutional guarantee of human rights not only to the relationship between the state and the 
individual but also to relations between private individuals, but only where the State has a duty 
[ ... ] to protect the human rights of one of the parties as against the other, whether by way of 
claim or defence." (emphasis added). 
64 NZ Amalgamated Engineering Printing & Manufacturing Union Inc. v Air New Zealand Ltd, 
above n 18, para 208. 
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fundamental rights considerations are - at least partly - determinative of what is 
"reasonable" in private (as in public65) relationships, the Bill of Rights might be 
seen to normatively concretize the general law of the land. It that case, the Bill of 
Rights does not only confer subjective rights on the individual, but also 
constitutes what could be called an objective order of values for the legal system 
as a whole.66 
So far, the discussion of the "sword" function has proceeded on the basis 
that a remedy against a private individual is at least potentially available. There 
still remains the situation in which the regulatory framework does not offer causes 
of action reflecting fundamental rights norms contained in the Bill of Rights Act 
or in international human rights treaties to which New Zealand is a party. For 
example, article 1 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
("ICCPR")67 stipulates that "[n Jo one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with his privacy [ ... ]" and that "everyone has the right to the 
protection of the law against such interference [ ... ]". While privacy in inter-
private relations is accorded some protection through the Trespass Act 1986 and 
the common law doctrine of breach of confidence, New Zealand law (still) does 
not recognize an all-embracing tort of invasion of privacy .68 Even though the long 
title of the Bill of Rights Act states that the Bill of Rights was enacted to "affirm 
New Zealand's commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
65 In R v N (No 2) (1999) 5 HRNZ 72, the Court of Appeal affirmed a District Court's pre-trial 
ruling to admit evidence that had been obtained by private individuals in the course of 
unlawfully detaining the later accused person. The District Court had considered whether 
admitting the evidence was "fair" at common law in light of the accused's guaranteed right to 
liberty and security. 
66 This is the approach to horizontality developed by the German Federal Constitutional Court in 
its Liith decision, above n 12; see also Hans D Jarass and Bodo Pieroth Grundgesetz fur die 
Bundesrepub/ik Deutsch/and - Kommentar (7ed, C.H. Beck, Munich , 2004), Vorb. vor Art. I, 
para 3; Bodo Pieroth and Bernhard Schlink Grundrechte - Staatsrecht 11 (20ed, C.F. MUiler, 
Heidelberg, 2004), 46; Michael Sachs (ed) Grundgesetz - Kommentar (3ed, C.H. Beck, 
Munich , 2003), vor Art. I, para 32; Bruno Schmidt-B leibtreu (ed) Kommentar zum 
Grundgesetz (!Oed, Wolters, Neuwied, 2004), Vorb. v. Art. I , para 8; Canaris, C laus-Wilhelm 
Grundrechte und Privatrecht ( de Gruyter, Berlin, 1999); Claus-Wilhelm Canaris 
"Grundrechtswirkungen und VerhaltnismaJ3igkeitsprinzip in der richterlichen Anwendung und 
Fortbildung des Privatrechts" [ 1989) JuS 161. 
67 
( 16 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171. 
68 See, for example, Hosking v Runting, above n 14; for the similar situation in the United 
Kingdom see Campbell v MGN Ltd, above n 10; Ivan Hare " Verticality Challenged: Private 
Parties, Privacy and the Human Rights Act" [2001) EHRLR 526; Ian Leigh, above n 13; 
Jonathan Morgan "Privacy in the House of Lords, Again" (2004) I 20 LQR 563; Gavin 
Phillipson "Judicial Reasoning in Breach of Confidence Cases under the Human Rights Act: 
Not Taking Privacy Seriously" [2003) EHRLR 54; Gavin Phillipson "Transfonning Breach of 
Confidence? Towards a Common Law Right of Privacy under the Human Rights Act" (2003) 
66 MLR 726. 
Rights"69 , a person seeking a remedy against a private individual who invades his 
or her privacy would still be powerless without a corresponding cause of action. 
If then a claimant cannot use the Bill of Rights Act directly against another 
private individual, the question arises whether it may instead be relied upon in 
relation to the deficient structuring law and/or the consequential decision of a 
court declining to give effect to a particular fundamental right or freedom. 70 In 
this context, the Bill of Rights might require the state to establish or expand rights 
within the regulatory framework to adequately protect a claimant's fundamental 
rights interests. The obvious difficulty with such an approach lies in the fact that 
at least the primary "act" of public power - the missing cause of action -
constitutes an omission. While certain acts "omitted" by public authorities may in 
general very well come within the ambit of section 3 of the Bill of Rights Act (for 
example, the failure to inform a detained person of his or her right to consult a 
lawyer71), the omission to provide for certain rights in a regulatory framework is 
of an entirely different nature. Given the multiple sources of law, it would already 
be difficult to determine - supposing that a certain right should in fact exist -
which branch of government would have been responsible and, more importantly, 
competent for creating the right. 
In addition, since Parliament is not a party to private lawsuits (and could not 
in any event be forced to enact specific pieces of legislation72), using the Bill of 
Rights Act as a "sword" would a priori be limited to what lies in the court's 
original duties and powers. And this leads to what really lies at the heart of the 
horizontality discussion. In the words of Paul Rishworth, referring to Canadian 
constitutional law commentator Peter Hogg, "[t]he debate is essentially about 
when the ordinary processes of democracy might by bypassed to extract remedies 
from courts for wrongs in the private sphere that are umegulated by legislation."73 
The statement demonstrates that the debate has also political implications. It is 
about the distribution of power between Parliament and the judiciary, and where 
to strike a balance between liberalism and necessary governmental intervention in 
the private realm. 
69 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, long title (b). 
7° Compare The Laws of New Zealand, above n 39, para 31. 
71 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 23(1)(b), 
72 Rishworth and ors, above n I, 74. 
73 Paul Rishworth and ors, above n I, 98, n J 96. 
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The preceding paragraphs tried to show that for an analysis of the so-called 
horizontal effect of the Bill and Rights Act a primary distinction should be made 
according to the way it is relied upon in private litigation. In summary, the Bill of 
Rights may be invoked to defend or justify private actions against claims by other 
private individuals, and it can - with certain reserves, especially where the general 
law does not recognize any cause of action - be relied upon to support claims 
directed against the actions of other private individuals said to unduly affect 
fundamental rights and freedoms. While this primarily describes the different 
roles the Bill of Rights Act may play in private litigation, the following two parts 
will now take a closer look at the actual impact and effect of using the Bill of 
Rights Act as a "shield" or "sword" respectively. 
III THE BILL OF RIGHTS AS A 'SHIELD' TO DEFEND PRIVATE 
ACTIONS AGAINST CLAIMS BY OTHER PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS 
As has been pointed out above, using the Bill of Rights as a "shield" in 
private litigation actually does not subject the private opponent to Bill of Rights 
standards. Rather, the Bill of Rights is invoked against the law (and/or the court 
decision) that sanctions the defendant's action. Although the various forms of law 
(statutory and common law, primary and subordinate legislation) make no 
difference in establishing a general susceptibility of so-called "private law" to Bill 
of Rights scrutiny, the potential impact on the outcome of the case can vary 
significantly depending on the nature of the rule in conflict with fundamental 
rights and freedoms. This becomes immediately obvious when looking at section 
4 of the Bill of Rights Act which provides that enactments found to be 
inconsistent with the Bill of Rights must nevertheless be applied. 
Consequently, it would appear useful to examine the effect of the Bill of 
Rights according to the different sources of law. Since it is not the parties but the 
law itself that serves as a gateway for Bill of Rights considerations in private 
litigation, it may not come as a surprise that the result will often follow the same 
lines as in litigation involving public actors who are directly bound by section 3 of 
the Bill of Rights Act.74 
74 This convergence of public and private law for the purposes of human rights scrutiny is the 
core element in the horizontality discussion by Murray Hunt, above n 5, 83-85 . 
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A The impact on primary and delegated legislation 
Roughly following the steps outlined by the Court of Appeal in Moonen v 
Film and Literature Board of Review 75, the starting point for an application of the 
Bill of Rights to primary and delegated76 legislation is section 6 of the Bill of 
Rights Act. It requires that enactments which have a potentially detrimental effect 
on fundamental rights and freedoms must be interpreted and applied as 
consistently with those rights and freedoms as possible. This direction, of course, 
also applies to enactments governing the relationship between private individuals. 
As one commentator rightly remarks 77 
"the Bill of Rights may well be applicable even in litigation between two private 
parties, neither of whom is caught by s. 3 [of the Bill of Rights Act]. If their 
dispute involves the interpretation and operation of an enactment, the Bill of 
Rights is relevant. Failure to appreciate this has led to several decisions, which 
are essentially about statutory interpretation, taking the unnecessary preliminary 
step of inquiring whether the party relying on the statute is caught bys. 3." 
Where the law appears to permit or require a remedy as demanded by a 
claimant that touches upon the defendant' s fundamental rights or freedoms, the 
court must first inquire whether the sanction would (already) be consistent with 
the Bill of Rights. 78 This will involve an application of section 5 of the Bill of 
Rights Act:79 if granting the remedy constitutes a reasonable limit of the 
75 [2000) 2 NZLR 9, 16 (CA). 
76 Section 6 of the Bill of Rights Act applies to "enactments" . Pursuant to section 29 of the 
Interpretation Act 1999, the word "enactment" means " the whole or a portion of an Act or 
regulations" (emphasis added). The term " regulations" comprises all delegated legislation 
except local authority by-laws; see Paul Rishworth and ors, above n I, 137. Apart from being 
directly subject to Bill of Rights standards, delegated legislation is ultimately controlled 
through scrutiny of the relevant statutory empowering provisions; see discussion below p 21. 
77 Paul Rishworth and ors, above n I , 80. 
78 Compare The laws of New Zealand, above n 39, Human Rights, para 42 . 
79 It is debatable whether "consistency" within the meaning of section 6 of the Bill of Rights Act 
actually requires prior consideration of section 5. It could also be understood in the way that an 
interpretation should be preferred which least affects guaranteed rights and freedoms in their 
absolute form , see Moonen v Film and literature Board of Review, above n 75, 16. In other 
words , where an enactment can be given a meaning that does not limit fundamental rights and 
freedoms at all , that meaning should be preferred. This would not contradict the decision by the 
Court of Appeal in Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992) 3 NZLR 260, which only rejected the 
view that where a right or freedom cannot be upheld in its entirety, section 4 would preclude a 
court from upholding it in at least a reasonably limited form. The decision says nothing to the 
effect that an enactment should a priori always be given a meaning which only upholds a 
fundamental right or freedom in a limited form ; see also Jan Stemplewitz "Section 6 of the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: A Case for Parliamentary Responsibility for Human 
Rights and Freedoms" (2002) 33 VUWLR 409, 417 . For the purposes of this paper, however, 
the distinction is not of primary importance, since it concerns the general reach of section 6 -
both in public and private litigation. 
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defendant's rights or freedoms prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified 
in a free and democratic society, the defendant's "overall" rights under the Bill of 
Rights Act would be preserved. Conversely, if the sanction sought by the claimant 
fails to meet this test, the court must proceed to determine whether the applicable 
enactments can be interpreted so as to achieve a resolution of the dispute that is 
(at least more) consistent with the standard set by section 5 - for example, by 
granting a different remedy or possibly by dismissing the claim altogether. 
Whether such alternatives are in fact open to the court depends on the 
general principles of interpretation that can generate different meanings of 
enactments.80 This is, however, an inherent problem of section 6 of the Bill of 
Rights Act and not peculiar to private litigation. 81 To the extent that an enactment 
cannot be given a meaning allowing for a Bill of Rights consistent determination, 
section 4 of the Bill of Rights Act ultimately directs the courts to accept such 
inconsistency and adjudicate the dispute accordingly. However, a declaration of 
inconsistency may be made. 82 
The situation of inconsistency should not arise where legislation governing 
the relationship between private individuals falls back on general standards or 
vague phrases such as "fair dealing", "reasonable" or "the interests of justice". In 
the absence of any specific overriding legislative direction, the Bill of Rights Act 
itself must be taken to reflect Parliament's intention to legislate consistently with 
guaranteed rights and freedoms. 83 "Basic rights are not to be overridden by the 
general words of a statute since the presumption is against the impairment of such 
basic rights."84 Consequently, broadly formulated phrases will ordinarily be 
capable of being given a Bill of Rights consistent meaning so as to only authorise 
remedies against a defendant in private litigation that no more than reasonably 
limit his or her fundamental rights and freedoms. 
The same principle ultimately controls Bill of Rights compliance of 
subordinate legislation that affects the relationship between private individuals. 
Although regulations may themselves be subject of Bill of Rights scrutiny as 
80 Paul Rishworth and ors, above n I, 133. 
81 For a discussion of the various techniques to accommodate rights and freedoms in enactments 
see Paul Rishworth and ors, above n I, 147-152, 163- I 66. 
82 Moonen v Film and literature Board of Review, above n 75, 17. 
83 Paul Rishworth and ors, above n I, 164. 
84 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Pierson [ 1998] AC 539, 575 (HL) Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson; see also Ngati Apa Ki Te Waipounamu Trust v R [2000] 2 NZLR 659, 712 
(CA) Elias CJ ("basic rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words in a statute"). 
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described above, their respective statutory empowering provisions can generally 
be interpreted as authorising only such delegated legislation as is consistent with 
the Bill of Rights. If they are inconsistent, or require judicial determinations that 
would be inconsistent, they exceed the power conferred by the empowering 
enactment and are therefore ultra vires. 85 
B The impact on the common law 
A large part of the debate about horizontality revolves around the common 
law. In order to keep track of a considerable amount of nuanced positions and 
approaches that has been generated especially in this area, two issues should be 
kept separate. 
On the one hand, the general susceptibility of the common law to Bill of 
Rights scrutiny. This question has already been dealt with above86 and should, for 
the reasons given there, be answered in the affirmative. On the other hand, the 
disagreement about the actual extent of any impact of the Bill of Rights on the 
common law.87 While a narrower view88 - similar to the approach under the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms89 - only sees a duty to take 
fundamental rights and freedoms into account when developing the common law, 
a broader view90 argues for an obligation of the courts to ensure that the common 
law is consistent with the Bill of Rights. 91 
On closer examination, the two views are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive; in fact, they are both valid - albeit in different circumstances. For the 
situation where a common law doctrine adversely touches upon fundamental 
rights and freedoms of a defendant in private litigation, the Bill of Rights can be 
invoked to ensure that the limitation is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society. In other words, courts are under an obligation to 
make consistent with Bill of Rights standards any common law doctrine that 
85 Drew v Attorney-General [2002) I NZLR 58 (CA). See also generally Jan Stemplewitz, above 
n 79; and Paul Rishworth and ors, above n I, 160. 
86 See above Part II A (pp 6-9). 
87 Compare Murray Hunt, above n 5, 78. 
88 Paul Rishworth and ors, above n I, I 00-10 I; Hosking v Runting, above n 14, 55 (CA) Tipping J. 
89 See Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union v Dolphin Delivery Ltd, above n 13, 603 
(SCC) McIntyre J ("the judiciary ought to app ly and develop the principles of the common law 
in a manner consistent with the fundamental values enshrined in the Constitution"). 
90 Andrew S Butler, above n 15; The Laws of New Zealand, above n 39, Human Rights, para 17. 
91 Gavin Philippson, above n 5, 830-831, describes the same two approaches as "weak indirect 
horizontality" and "strong indirect horizontality". 
imposes an unjustifiable limitation on the rights and freedoms of one private 
individual for the benefit of another.92 The reasons for this are fairly 
straightforward: 
While the interpretation direction in section 6 of the Bill of Rights Act only 
applies to enactments, there is nothing to suggest that Parliament intended its own 
acts to be subject to a higher level of Bill of Rights influence and scrutiny than the 
common law. Consequently, courts must interpret and apply their own set of rules 
equally consistently with the rights and freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights. 
However, the decisive difference between the common law and private law 
enactments lies in the fact that where enactments cannot be given a meaning 
consistent with section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act, section 4 ultimately preserves 
them. As there is no comparable savings provision for the common law, any of its 
limits to fundamental rights or freedoms that do not meet the standard of section 5 
are unlawful, and, according to the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty under 
which statutory law (in this case section 5) overrides the common law, must not 
be applied.93 This leads effectively to a duty of the courts to bring common law 
rules that sanction private actions and thereby unreasonably limit a defendant's 
rights or freedoms within the requirements of section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act. 
In summary, a defendant in private litigation can rely on the Bill of Rights 
Act as a "shield" to ensure that any judicial determination (whether based on 
statutory or common law) made against him or her will be consistent94 with the 
Bill of Rights - save for the case where express statutory language mandates an 
inconsistent resolution of the dispute. 
92 As an example, compare Lange v Atkinson and Australian Consolidated Press NZ Ltd, above 
n 14, where Elias J (as she then was) adapted the common law of defamation to adequately 
protect the defendant ' s right to freedom of expression and to avoid a decision that would have 
otherwise been inconsistent with the Bill of Rights Act. The case is, in fact, only a hybrid 
example for conforming the common law to Bill of Rights standards, since " the compromises 
achieved by the law of defamation are largely the result of judicial decision , modified by 
statute" (above n 14, 32). In the end, however, Elias J extended the common law defence of 
qualified privilege which had been expressly preserved by the Defamation Act 1992. 
93 The common law is clearly "law" for the purposes of section 5; see TVJ Network Ltd v 
Eveready New Zealand Ltd [1993] 3 NZLR 435, 440 (CA); The Laws of New Zealand, above 
n 39, Human Rights, para 17 . 
94 Of course, "consistent" does not necessarily mean that the claim against him or her will be 
dismissed; see above Part Ill A (p 20). 
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IV THE BILL OF RIGHTS AS A 'SWORD' TO SUPPORT CLAIMS 
AGAINST OTHER PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS 
The following chapter will deal with the effect of the Bill of Rights Act 
under the opposite scenario - where a claimant seeks to rely on fundamental 
rights and freedoms to support his or her action against another private individual. 
Since the private respondent does not owe any duty directly under the Bill of 
Rights Act, the focus must again be on the general law governing the relationship 
between the parties to the litigation. 
A The impact on existing causes of action 
A claimant will usually invoke the Bill of Rights if he or she is of the view 
that the general law is too restrictive in making available certain remedies against 
private actions that affect the claimant' s fundamental rights and freedoms . A good 
example would be statutory limitation periods95 that simply bar actions after a 
prescribed period of time.96 Similarly, defence provisions and exceptions, such as 
section 31 of the Human Rights Act 1993 which allows discrimination on political 
grounds in certain employment matters, can effectively deny an otherwise 
available remedy. However, as enactments, they are logically subject to the same 
kind of Bill of Rights review and impact described above for the "shield" 
situation. In particular, section 6 of the Bill of Rights Act requires courts to 
interpret and apply both provisions that actually establish a right against another 
private individual , as well as any applicable defensive counterparts, as 
consistently with the Bill of Rights as possible. Furthermore,97 
"statutory implications required to achieve rights-consistency need not be 
sourced in any specific legislative intent, for the Bill of Rights itself reflects a 
general statement of Parliamentary intent to legislate consistently with rights. ln 
that way the Bill of Rights can be conceived as a delegation of authori ty to read 
down [ defence provisions and exceptions] and read in [ extensions of restrictive 
requirements] where thi s would not be inconsistent with legislative purpose." 
95 See, for example, Limitations Act 1950, s 4. 
96 Compare also The Laws of New Zealand, above n 39, Human Rights, para 30, citing decisions 
by the Irish Supreme Court in O 'Brien v Keogh (1972] IR 144 and O 'Brien v Manufacturing 
Engineering Ltd [ 1973] IR 334. 
97 Paul Ri shworth and ors, above n I, 164. VICTORIA JN1VERS1 ,-y OF 
WELLINGTON LIBRARY 
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Since it cannot make any significant difference whether a cause of action 
happens to be based on statutory or common law, the same principles must 
generally apply in relation to the common law - of course with the qualification 
that any common law rule imposing umeasonable requirements for obtaining a 
remedy to redress rights infringing actions by private individuals will be unlawful 
under section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.98 In Campbell v MGN Ltd, a case that 
hinged on the question of adapting existing common law causes of action to 
protect privacy, Baroness Hale of Richmond correctly remarked that99 
"[n]either party to this appeal has challenged the basic principles which have 
emerged from the Court of Appeal in the wake of the [Human Rights Act 1998]. 
The 1998 Act does not create any new cause of action between private persons. 
But if there is a relevant cause of action applicable, the court as a public authority 
must act compatibly with both parties' convention rights. [ ... ] [W]here existing 
remedies are available, the court not only can but must balance the competing 
convention rights of the parties." 
B A duty to create new causes of action? 
What remains to be addressed then is the question how fundamental rights 
and freedoms might influence the outcome of private litigation in areas where the 
relationship between private individuals has (thus far) been left unregulated. For 
example, while the law sets out rules against the uninvited physical intrusion onto 
private property, it does not regulate the use of a telephoto lens to surreptitiously 
take pictures of individuals in private surroundings. A court confronted with an 
application for a remedy against private actions in these circumstances will 
inevitably face the problem that there is no legal basis for granting relief. Where 
the general law does not provide for any appropriate cause of action, the 
respondent is under no duty to refrain from his or her actions. Correspondingly, 
the applicant has no right against him or her. 
98 See above Patt III B (p 22). 
99 Campbell v MGN Ltd, above n 10, para 132-133 (HL). For New Zealand - although not in the 
context of private litigation - see for example Simpson v Attorney-General [Baigent 's Case], 
above n 15, 676 (CA) Cooke P ("Section 3 [ of the Bill of Rights Act] also makes it clear that 
the Act applies to acts done by the Courts. The Act is binding on us, and we would fail in our 
duty if we did not give an effective remedy to a person whose legislatively affirmed rights have 
been infringed"). 
But maybe the applicant should have such a right. After all, his or her 
guaranteed fundamental rights and freedoms are - albeit indirectly - affected. 100 
Although both the state in general and the legislature in particular must be given a 
margin of appreciation as regards the implementation of certain policies into the 
legal matrix that governs private and public relationships, the Bill of Rights sets 
standards to which the actions of the state must conform. 
The lack of a right within that matrix might therefore trigger a right against 
the state. In the context of private litigation, given that the judiciary cannot 
establish new statutory rights and duties, a court might be under a duty to develop 
new common law causes of action where existing statutory and common law both 
fail to protect fundamental rights and freedoms against infringement by private 
individuals. Such a proposition is, of course, not uncontested. During the passage 
the United Kingdom's Human Rights Act 1998, the Lord Chancellor remarked: 101 
"I would not agree with any proposition that the courts as public authorities will 
be obliged to fashion a law on privacy because of the terms of the Bill. That is 
simply not so. If it were so, whenever a law cannot be found either in the statute 
book or as a rule of common law to protect a convention right, the courts would 
in effect be obliged to legislate by way of judicial decision and to make one. That 
is not the true position.[ ... ] In my opinion, the court is not obliged to remedy the 
failure by legislating via the common law either where a convention right is 
infringed by incompatible legislation or where, because of the absence of 
legislation - say, privacy legislation - a convention right is left unprotected. In 
my view, the courts may not act as legislators and grant new remedies for 
infringement of convention rights unless the common law itself enables them to 
develop new rights or remedies." 
Leaving aside the correctness or otherwise of the Lord Chancellor's opinion, 
two general issues can be distilled from his statement: 
100 In the case of a right against invasion of privacy, matters are further complicated by the fact 
that the Bill of Rights Act does not expressly recognize such a right, notwithstanding article 17 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, above n 67, to which New Zealand 
is a party. Similar problems arise in relation to the protection of family, home and 
correspondence, and certain prohibited grounds of discrimination contained in article 26 of the 
ICCPR, neither of which have a Bill of Rights counterpart. On the possibilities to give effect to 
unincorporated international human rights instruments, see Ashby v Minister of Immigration 
[ 198 I] I NZLR 222 (CA); Tavita v Minister of Immigration [ 1994) 2 NZLR 257 (CA); Claudia 
Geiringer "Tavita and all that: Confronting the Confusion Surrounding Unincorporated 
Treaties and Administrative Law" (2004) 21 NZULR 66. 
10 1 Lord Irvine ofLairg, Hansard, HL Yol 583, 24 November 1997, col 785. 
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First and foremost, courts could only be "obliged" to create a new common 
law cause of action as a matter of fundamental rights and freedoms, if the Bill of 
Rights is conceived not only to restrain governmental conduct, but also to impose 
positive obligations or duties on the state to secure it against infringement by 
private individuals. Secondly, the judiciary would have to be the proper 
governmental actor for discharging any such obligations by widening the range of 
common law causes of action. 
I Positive obligations to protect fundamental rights and freedoms 
New Zealand courts have so far been reluctant to ascribe a protective or 
positive dimension to fundamental rights and freedoms 102 - at least to those which 
are not already formulated in an obligatory way, for example the right to be 
informed of the reasons for an arrest or detention. 103 Insofar, Murray Hunt's plain 
assertion "that all fundamental rights have a positive dimension which imposes on 
the State a positive obligation to act to secure those rights where threatened by 
other actors" 104 appears somewhat daring. The contrary view is expressed, for 
example, by Paul Rishworth who generally sees fundamental rights and freedoms 
only as a fetter on state power and not a reason for its exercise. 105 
A useful starting point for a deeper exploration of this issue might be the 
long title of the Bill of Rights Act. It states in paragraph (a) that the Bill of Rights 
Act is to "affirm, protect, and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
New Zealand" 106. At first sight, the words "promote" and "protect" both seem to 
point in favour of some form of protective dimension. However, the more 
immediate reason for their insertion in the long title appears to relate to the 
traditional function of a Bill of Rights, ie to strengthen human rights principles 
and their observance by combining them in a single, prominent constitutional 
instrument. 107 Through their very inclusion in a Bill of Rights, fundamental rights 
and freedoms are "promoted" and "protected". 108 
102 See for example Mendelssohn v Attorney-General [ 1999] 2 NZLR 268, 272 (CA). 
103 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 23(1)(a). 
104 Murray Hunt, above n 5, 77. 
105 Paul Rishworth and ors, above n I, 57 ("They are reasons for governmental restraint rather 
than action"). 
106 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, long title (a). 
107 See also Johan Steyn "Democracy through Law" [2002] EHRLR 723, 731. 
108 Paul Rishworth and ors, above n I, 61. 
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However, paragraph (b) of the long title may take matters further. It affirms 
New Zealand's commitment to the ICCPR, so that jurisprudence and commentary 
generated thereunder are of importance to the interpretation and application of the 
Bill of Rights Act. '09 The general comments of the United Nations Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights in fact establish that - as a matter of public 
international law - there are positive obligations incumbent on a state to protect at 
least some of the rights in the I CCPR from interference by private indiduals. 110 
Furthermore, as a signatory state to the ICCPR New Zealand is obligated "to 
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant"' 11 and to "adopt such laws or other measures 
as may be necessary to give effect to the rights in the present Covenant". 112 
According to article 2(3)(a) of the ICCPR this includes the obligation to provide 
an effective remedy for violations of the Covenant - irrespective of whether they 
have been committed by governmental actors or private individuals.' 13 
The recognition of a protective dimension of certain fundamental rights and 
freedoms is also supported by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights ("ECHR") with respect to the European Convention for the Protection of 
109 R v Goodwin (No 2) [ 1993) 2 NZLR 390, 393 (CA) Cooke P; Nicholls v Registrar of the Court 
of Appeal [1998) 2 NZLR 385,404 (CA) Eichelbaum CJ. 
110 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights General Comment 16: The 
Right to Respect of Privacy, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and 
Reputation <http: //www .unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/> (last accessed 30 May 2005), para I: 
"Article 17 provides for the right of every person to be protected against arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence as well as against 
unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation . In the view of the Committee this right is 
required to be guaranteed against all such interferences and attacks whether they emanate 
from State authorities or from natural or legal persons. The obligations imposed by this 
article require the State to adopt legislative and other measures to give effect to the 
prohibition against such interferences and attacks as well as to the protection of this right." 
( emphasis added) 
General Comment 20: Replaces general comment 7 concerning prohibition of torture and 
cruel treatment or punishment <http: //www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc .nsf/> (last accessed 30 May 
2005), para 2: 
"The aim of the provisions of article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights is to protect both the dignity and the physical and mental integrity of the individual. 
It is the duty of the State party to afford everyone protection through legislative and other 
measures as may be necessary against the acts prohibited by article 7, whether inflicted by 
people acting in their official capacity, outside their official capacity or in a private 
capacity" (emphasis added). 
111 ICCPR, above n 67, art 2(1). 
112 ICCPR, above n 67, art 2(2). 
11 3 ICCPR, above n 67, art 2(3)(a) requires states to provide an effective remedy for violations 
"notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official 
capacity", thereby implying that an effective remedy must a fortiori be provided for any 
violation by private individuals . 
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Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 114 In X an Y v The Netherlands, the 
ECHR noted that 115 
"although the object of Article 8 is essentially that of protecting the individual 
against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it does not merely compel 
the State to abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily negative 
undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for 
private or family life [ ... ]. These obligations may involve the adoption of 
measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the 
relations of individuals between themselves." (emphasis added) 
In Glaser v United Kingdom, the Court added that 116 
"[this includes] both the provision of a regulatory framework of adjudicatory and 
enforcement machinery protecting individuals' rights and the implementation, 
where appropriate, of specific steps.[ ... ] [R]egard must be had to the fair balance 
which has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and the 
community, including other concerned third parties, and the state's margin of 
appreciation". 
The same principles are articulated in a number of other decisions by the 
ECHR, 117 and not just in relation to the protection of the right to life. For example, 
in Plattform 'Arzte fur das Leben' v Austria, the Court held that 118 
"genuine, effective freedom of peaceful assembly cannot [ ... ] be reduced to a 
mere duty on the part of the state not to interfere: a purely negative conception 
would not be compatible with the object and purpose of Article I I. Like Article 
8, Article 11 sometimes requires positive measures to be taken, even in the 
sphere of relations between individuals, if need be." 
Although these European decisions are not binding on the New Zealand 
judiciary, they are nevertheless persuasive authorities that should be given 
considerable weight in guiding courts when confronted with issues of fundamental 
114 See Clare Ovey and Robin White Jacobs & White - European Convention on Human Rights 
(3ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002), 38. 
115 (1986) 8 EHRR 235, para 23 (ECHR). 
116 [2000] 3 FCR 193 , para 63 (Section III, ECHR). 
11 7 See, for example, A irey v Ireland (I 979-80) 2 EHRR 305 (ECHR) and A rtico v Italy ( 1981) 3 
EHHR I (ECHR). 
118 (1991) 13 EHRR 204, para 32 (ECHR). See also A v United Kingdom (1998) 27 EHRR 611 
(ECHR) in relation to the right not to be subjected to torture or to inhumane or degrading 
treatment, art. 3 of the Convention, and Young, James and Webster v United Kingdom (1981) 4 
EHRR 38 (ECHR) in relation to freedom of assembly, art. 11 of the Convention. 
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rights and freedoms. 119 Considering New Zealand's international obligations and 
commitment to the ICCPR, affirmed by the long title of the Bill of Rights Act, it 
seems both necessary and prudent to recognize positive obligations to protect 
rights and freedoms against interference by private individuals at least to the 
extent required under the Covenant. 
2 Positive obligations of the courts - Legitimacy issues 
This of course does not say anything about whether - on the domestic law 
level and under the Bill of Rights Act - courts are the proper addressee of those 
(limited) positive obligations. One could equally, and probably more naturally, 
place them on the legislative branch of government. Paul Rishworth accordingly 
voices the concern that courts are "institutionally unsuited to making more than 
incremental adjustments to common law." 120 Indeed, the legislature could be seen 
as best placed to make decisions on competing interests in society: 121 
"Balancing of interests is a quintessentially legislative task. We normally look to 
the political rather than the legal branches of government for calculations of 
general welfare. Only the legislature is equipped to deal with the vast array of 
data that is relevant to such an inquiry. No only do the courts lack the expertise 
and the resources to consider these legislative facts, the litigants in a private 
lawsuit are unlikely to place them on the record." 
This argument, however, relates more to the appropriateness of the general 
concept of human rights review under a Bill of Rights. It is not an argument 
confined to or specific to the role and effect of fundamental rights and freedoms in 
private litigation. 122 As section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act shows, Parliament 
expressly requires the judiciary to balance interests when determing whether a 
limit to fundamental rights and freedoms is "reasonable" and "demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society". 
11 9 See Paul Rishworth and ors, above n I , 65 . For examples of the impact on decisions by courts 
in the United Kingdom, see Venables and Thompson v News Group Newspapers Ltd, above 
n 10; X (a woman formerly known as Mary Bell) v SO [2003] EWHC 110 I; Douglas and Zeta 
Jones and Ors v Hello! Ltd, above n I 0. 
120 Pau I Rishworth and ors, above n I, IOI. 
12 1 Patrick J Monahan " Judicial Review and Democracy: a Theory of Judicial Review" (1987) 21 
U.Brit.Colum.L.Rev. 87, 97. 
122 Andrew S Butler, above n 11 , l 5. 
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In reality, the concerns have little to do with the respective ability of 
Parliament and the courts to make certain value judgments. They much more 
relate to the concept of separation of powers - and thereby to the distribution of 
power between the executive and judicial branch of government. The creation of 
new common law causes of action is often seen as an undue encroachment on 
parliamentary sovereignty. To disguise the rather political nature of this assertion, 
it is usually cloaked in arguments about democracy: for example, that judges are 
not democratically elected and that they cannot be held accountable by the people. 
Not dwelling on the questionable merits of these arguments, 123 it is important to 
stress that such views fail to appreciate from the outset that the Bill of Rights Act 
itself124 
"[reflects] an embryonic new 'settlement' as to the respective roles of legislature 
and judiciary in the protection of rights, one in which the judicial role is not 
premised on a deemed legislative intent to be searched for in each enactment, but 
on an independent judicial responsibility and allegiance to the rights and 
freedoms themselves." ( emphasis added) 
Where Parliament fails to comply with international obligations to provide 
adequate means for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms within the 
regulatory framework, the judiciary should act under its own "responsibility and 
allegiance" to those rights and freedoms. This is in no way incompatible with the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, as the legislature is, of course, at liberty to 
expressly amend any new common law developments should it reach different 
conclusions on the basis of broader policy considerations. However, mere silence 
and idleness do not suffice. In the context of fundamental rights and freedoms, 
parliamentary sovereignty comes at the price of exercising parliamentary 
responsibility. 125 
In conclusion, a duty of the courts to develop the common law so as to 
provide an adequate cause of action for the protection of fundamental rights and 
freedoms arises under the following preconditions: (1) the affected right or 
freedom can or, as a matter of New Zealand's international obligations, must be 
123 For a discussion see Johan Steyn, above n l 07, 724. 
124 Paul Rishworth and ors, above n I, 120. 
125 See Jan Stemplewitz, above n 79, 410, 423. Compare also discussion in Lange v Atkinson 
[1998] 3 NZLR 424, 462 (CA) on the argument (rejected by the Court of Appeal) that the 
creation of a new defence of "political expression" should be left to the legislature. 
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interpreted to contain a positive obligation to protect against certain interferences 
by private individuals; 126 and (2) Parliament has not (sufficiently) incorporated 
that protective dimension into the general law of land. In all other cases, 
especially in the absence of a positive obligation to protect, the judiciary will meet 
its responsibility under the Bill of Rights Act by taking into account the values 
and standards expressed therein when assessing the need for a development of the 
common law. The narrower view 127 on the impact of the Bill of Rights on the 
common law is thereby accommodated to the overall scheme of applying 
fundamental rights and freedoms in private litigation. 
V CONCLUSION 
This paper has tried to systematically approach the various issues that arise 
in connection with the Bill of Rights Act in private litigation, and to either point 
out or develop possible solutions on an abstract level. As a result, it appears fair to 
say that the Bill of Rights Act is far from irrelevant to the substantive 
determination of legal disputes between private individuals. 128 Its role to shield 
from inconsistent limitations at the hands of private law rules and corresponding 
court decisions very much follows the familiar modus operandi of Bill of Rights 
litigation with public actors that actually come within the ambit of section 3 of the 
Bill of Rights Act. This is the logical consequence of focussing on the law and 
judicial determinations as relevant acts of public power that need to conform to 
Bill of Rights standards. 
The transgression of the public/private divide in relation to the nature of the 
litigants does not contradict the exclusion of private individuals from the 
applicability clause in section 3. First and foremost, a direct duty to observe 
guaranteed rights and freedoms does not "apply" to them. This explains the only 
limited ability of the Bill of Rights to act as a sword in protecting rights and 
freedoms against infringements by private individuals. Insofar, instead of 
speaking of a "horizontal application" of fundamental rights and freedoms as 
126 As the ECHR's decisions mentioned above demonstrate, an obligation to protect fundamental 
rights and freedoms does not necessarily arise under all circumstances; see, for example, 
Plattform 'Arzte fiir das Leben ' v Austria, above n 118, para 32 ("Like Article 8, Article 11 
sometimes requires positive measures to be taken" ( emphasis added)) . 
127 See above Part III B (p 21 ). 
128 As regards procedure, it has always been uncontested that certain guarantees such section 27(1) 
(right to natural justice) and section 27(2) (right to appeal) equally apply to private litigation. 
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between private individuals, the term "horizontal effect" 129 would seem more 
accurate and maybe less intimidating. Furthermore, the distinction made by 
section 3 remains highly relevant, for example, for the possibility of a Baigent130 
type public law tort action. Moreover, the determination of what constitutes a 
reasonable limitation demonstrably justified in a free a democratic society under 
section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act will inevitably be different where private 
entities are concerned on either side of the equation. 131 
The fear that a significant effect of the Bill of Rights on interpersonal 
relationships will threaten personal autonomy is by and large unfounded. As the 
"shield" function demonstrates, it even enhances personal liberty. Besides, the 
argument is somewhat misplaced, since nothing would prevent a sovereign 
legislature from imposing rules and "public standards" on private relationships in 
areas that were previously unregulated. Again, the standards and balancing 
exercises to be observed by the legislature under the Bill of Rights would rather 
act as a safeguard to the liberty of conducting one's own affairs as freely as 
possible. Finally, what needs to be kept in mind is that the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act only guarantees a fairly limited amount of rights and freedoms that 
may become relevant as between private individuals. Since it does not include 
certain social, economic and property rights elsewhere recognized, for example, in 
the German Basic Law132 or under the United States Constitution 133 , the problem 
of horizontality remains confined to a manageable framework. In return, the New 
Zealand judiciary should fully embrace the principles of giving effect to 
fundamental rights and freedoms in private litigation. This would - last but not 
least - also enhance the perception of the public that the Bill of Rights is more 
than a "drunk-drivers' charter", that it can rather offer something to all New 
Zealanders. 
129 Shaun D Pattinson and Deryck Beyleveld, above n 9, 626. 
130 Simpson v Attorney-General [Baigent 's Case], above n I 5. 
131 The Laws of New Zealand, above n 39, Human Rights, para 28. 
132 See, for example, articles 2, 12 and 14 of the Basic Law which guarantee freedom of contract, 
freedom to choose and pursue a profession, and freedom from interference with property. For 
an example of the "constitutionalisation" of the German law of guarantees and assumption of 
debt see the recent decision of the Federal Supreme Court in BGHZ 156, 302, translated 
summary by Jan Stemplewitz "Report - Bundesgerichtshof-Zivilsachen (Federal Court of 
Justice - Private Law) 2003" in Russel Miller and Peer Zumbansen (eds) Annual of German 
and European law, Vol. 2, 2004 (Berghan Books, Oxford/New York, 2005)forthcoming. 
133 See, for example, the takings clause in the Fifth Amendment to the Consitution prohibiting the 
confiscation of private property without just confiscation; or the right to privacy found to be 
implicit in the First, Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments, see Griswold v Connecticut (1965) 
381 us 479, 484. 
32 
Bibliography 
Amelung, Tilman Ulrich "Damage Awards for Infringement of Privacy - The 
German Approach" (1999) 14 Tul. Eur. & Civ. L. F. 15 
Bamforth, Nicholas "The True 'Horizontal Effect' of the Human Rights Act 
1998" (2001) 117 LQR 34 
Bamforth, Nicholas "The Application of the Human Rights Act 1998 to Public 
Authorities and Private Bodies" (1999) 58 CLJ 159 
Beyleveld, Deryck and Shaun D Pattinson "Horizontal Applicability and 
Horizontal Effect" (2002) 118 LQR 623 
Borrie, Sir Gordon "The Regulation of Public and Private Power" [1989] PL 552 
Bowen, Andrew J "Fundamental Rights in Private Law" (2000) 20 SL T 157 
Brinktrine, Ralf "The Horizontal Effect of Human Rights in German 
Constitutional Law: the British Debate on Horizontality and the Possible Role 
Model of the German Doctrine of Mittelbare Drittwirkung der Grundrechte" 
[2001] EHRLR 421 
Butler, Andrew S and Petra Butler "Human Rights" in The Laws of New Zealand 
(Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2003) 
Butler, Andrew S "Constitutional Rights in Private Litigation: a Critique and 
Comparative Analysis" (1993) 22 Anglo-Am. L. Rev. 1 
Butler, Andrew S "The New Zealand Bill of Rights and Private Common Law 
Litigation" (1991) NZLJ 261 
Buxton, Richard "The Human Rights Act and Private Law" (2000) 116 LQR 48 
Canaris, Claus-Wilhelm Grundrechte und Privatrecht ( de Gruyter, Berlin, 1999) 
Canaris, Claus-Wilhelm "Grundrechtswirkungen und Verhaltnisma13igkeitsprinzip 
in der richterlichen Anwendung und Fortbildung des Privatrechts" [1989] JuS 161 
Classen, Claus Dieter "Drittwirkung der Grundrechte in der Rechtsprechung des 
BVerfG" (1997) 122 Archiv des offentlichen Rechts (AoR) 63 
Clayton, Richard "Developing Principles for Human Rights" [2002] EHRLR 175 
Dreier, Horst ( ed) Grundgesetz - Kommentar - Band I (2nd ed, Mohr Siebeck, 
Ttibingen, 2004) 
Du Plessis, Max and Jolyon Ford "Developing the Common Law Progressively -
Horizontality, the Human Rights Act and the South African Experience" [2004] 
EHRLR 286 
33 
Gardbaum, Stephen "The 'Horizontal Effect' of Constitutional Rights" (2003) 102 
Mich. L. Rev. 387 
Geiringer, Claudia "Tavita and all that: Confronting the Confusion Surrounding 
Unincorporated Treaties and Administrative Law" (2004) 21 NZULR 66 
Graber, Christoph Beat and Gunther Teubner "Art and Money: Consitutional 
Rights in the Private Sphere?" (1998) 18 OxJLS 61 
Hare, Ivan "Verticality Challenged: Private Parties, Privacy and the Human 
Rights Act" [2001] EHRLR 526 
Hogg, Peter Constitutional Law of Canada ( 4th ed, Carswell, Scarborough, 1997) 
Hunt, Murray "Human Rights and the Public-Private Distinction" in Grant 
Huscroft and Paul Rish worth (eds) Litigating Rights: Perspectives from Domestic 
and International Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2002) 71 
Hunt, Murray "The 'Horizontal Effect' of the Human Rights Act" [1998] PL 423 
Huscroft, Grant and Paul Rishworth ( eds) Litigating Rights: Perspectives from 
Domestic and International Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2002) 
Jarass, Hans D and Bodo Pieroth Grundgesetz fiir die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschfand - Kommentar (7 ed, C.H. Beck, Mi.inchen, 2004) 
Lester, Antony and David Pannick "The Impact of the Human Rights Act on 
Private Law: the Knight's Move" (2000) 116 LQR 380 
Leigh, Ian "Horizontal Rights, The Human Rights Act and Privacy: Lessons from 
the Commonwealth" (1999) 48 ICLQ 57 
Loveland, Ian "The Horizontal Direct Effect of the Human Rights Act" (2000) 
150 NLJ No 6957, 1595 
Markesinis, Basil S "Privacy, Freedom of Expression, and the Horizontal Effect 
of the Human Rights Bill: Lessons from Germany" (1999) 115 LQR 47 
Monahan, Patrick J "Judicial Review and Democracy: a Theory of Judicial 
Review" (1987) 21 U.Brit.Colum.L.Rev. 87 
Morgan, Jonathan "Privacy in the House of Lords, Again" (2004) 120 LQR 563 
Oliver, Dawn "The Human Rights Act and Public/Private Law Divides" [2000] 
EHRLR343 
Ovey, Clare and Robin White Jacobs & White - European Convention on Human 
Rights (3 ed, Oxford 2002) 
Phillipson, Gavin "Judicial Reasoning in Breach of Confidence Cases under the 
Human Rights Act: Not Taking Privacy Seriously" [2003] EHRLR 54 
34 
Phillipson, Gavin "The horizontal effect of the Human Rights Act: the story so 
far" (2003) 38 S. L. Rev. 14 
Phillipson, Gavin "The Human Rights Act, 'horizontal effect' and the common 
law: a bang or a whimper?" ( 1999) 62 MLR 824 
Phillipson, Gavin "Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a Common 
Law Right of Privacy under the Human Rights Act" (2003) 66 MLR 726 
Pieroth, Bodo and Bernhard Schlink Grundrechte - Staatsrecht II (20 ed, C.F. 
Mtiller, Heidelberg, 2004) 
Quint, Peter E. "Free Speech and Private Law in German Constitutional Theory" 
(1998) 48 Maryland LR 247 
Raphael, Thomas "The Problem of Horizontal Effect" (2000] EHRLR 493 
Rishworth, Paul, Grant Huscroft, Scott Optican, Richard Mahoney The New 
Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2003) 
Sachs, Michael (ed) Grundgesetz - Kommentar (3 ed, C.H. Beck, Munich, 2003) 
Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Bruno (ed) Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (10 ed, Wolters, 
Neuwied, 2004) 
Schwabe, Jtirgen "Bundesverfassungsgericht und Drittwirkung der Grundrechte" 
(1975) 100 Archiv des offentlichen Rechts (AoR), 442 
Stemplewitz, Jan "Report - Bundesgerichtshof-Zivilsachen (Federal Court of 
Justice - Private Law) 2003" in Russel Miller and Peer Zumbansen (eds) Annual 
of German and European Law, Vol. 2, 2004 (Berghan Books, Oxford/New York, 
2005) [page not yet available] 
Stemplewitz, Jan "Section 6 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: A Case 
for Parliamentary Responsibility for Human Rights and Freedoms" (2002) 33 
VUWLR409 
Steyn, Johan "Democracy through Law" (2002] EHRLR 723 
Taylor, Greg "The Horizontal Effect of Human Rights, the German Model and its 
Applicability to Common Law Jurisdictions" (2002) 13 King's Coll. L.J. 187 
Tushnet, Mark "The Issue of State Action / Horizontal Effect in Comparative 
Constitutional Law" (2003) 1 Int ' l J. Const. L. 79 
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights General 
Comment 16: The Right to Respect of Privacy, Home and Correspondence, and 
Protection of Honour and Reputation <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/> (last 
accessed 30 May 2005) 
35 
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights General 
Comment 20: Replaces general comment 7 concerning prohibition of torture and 
cruel treatment or punishment <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/> (last accessed 
30 May 2005) 
Wade, H. W.R. "Horizons ofHorizontality" (2000) 116 LQR 217 
Young, Alison L. "Remedial and Substantive Horizontality" [2002] PL 232 
Table of Cases 
A v United Kingdom ( 1999) 27 EHRR 611 (ECHR) 
Airey v Ireland (1979-80) 2 EHRR 305 (ECHR) 
Artico v Italy ( 1981) 3 EHHR 1 (ECHR) 
Ashby v Minister of Immigration [1981] 1 NZLR 222 (CA) 
Baker v Canada [ 1999] 2 SCR 817 (SCC) 
Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22 (HL) 
Douglas and Zeta Jones and ors v Hello! Ltd [2001] QB 967 (CA) 
Douglas and Zeta Jones and Ors v Hello! Ltd [2003] EWHC 786 (Ch) 
Drew v Attorney-General [2002] 1 NZLR 58 (CA) 
Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (3) S.A. 850, 914H (Const Ct SA) 
Duffv Communicado [1996] 2 NZLR 89 (HC) 
Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd [1999] 3 WLR 1113 (HL) 
Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) 
Glaser v United Kingdom [2000] 3 FCR 193 (Section III, ECHR) 
Griswoldv Connecticut (1965) 381 US 479, 484. 
Lange v Atkinson [1998] 3 NZLR 424 (CA) 
Lange v Atkinson and Australian Consolidated Press NZ Ltd [1997] 2 NZLR 22 (HC) 
Luth (1958) 7 BVerfGE 198 (Gennan Federal Constitutional Court) English 
translation available at <http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/global_law/german-
cases/cases_bverg.shtml?l5janl 958> (last accessed 30 May 2005) 
36 
Ministry of Transport v Noort [ 1992] 3 NZLR 260 (CA) 
Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA) 
New York Times Co v Sullivan (1964) 376 US 254 
Ngati Apa Ki Te Waipounamu Trust v R [2000] 2 NZLR 659 (CA) 
Nicholls v Registrar of the Court of Appeal [1998] 2 NZLR 385 (CA) 
NZ Amalgamated Engineering Printing & Manufacturing Union Inc. v Air New 
Zealand Ltd (2004) 7 NZELC 97, 367; (2004) 7 HRNZ 539 (Emp Ct) 
Plattform 'Arzte fur das Leben ' v Austria (1991) 13 EHRR 204 (ECHR) 
R v Butcher [1992] 2 NZLR 257 (CA) 
R v Goodwin (No 2) [1993] 2 NZLR 390 (CA) 
R v H [1994] 2 NZLR 143 (CA) 
R v N [1999] 1 NZLR 713 (CA) 
R v N (No 2) (1999) 5 HRNZ 72 (CA) 
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Pierson [1998] AC 539 (HL) 
Re J [1996] 2 NZLR 134 (CA) 
Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union v Dolphin Delivery Ltd [1986] 
2 SCR 573 (SCC) 
Shelley v Kraemer (1947) 334 US 1 
Simpson v Attorney-General [Baigent 's Case J [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA) 
Solicitor-General v Radio New Zealand Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 48 (HC) 
Tavita v Minister of Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 257 (CA) 
Television New Zealand v Newsmonitor Services Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 91 (HC) 
TVJ Network Ltd v Eveready New Zealand Ltd [1993] 3 NZLR 435 (CA) 
Venables and Thompson v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] 1 All ER 908, 
[2001] 2 WLR 1038 (Fam D) 
X (A womanformerly known as Mary Bell) v SO [2003] EWHC 1101 
X and Yv The Netherlands (1986) 8 EHRR 235 (ECHR) 
Young, James and Webster v United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHHR 38 (ECHR) 
37 
Table of International Instruments 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 
(4 November 1950) 213 UNTS 221 , ETS 5 (1993) 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966) 999 
UNTS 171 
Table of Statutes and Consitutions 
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, English translation by 
Tschentscher, Axel The Basic Law (Grundgesetz) - The Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Germany (May 23rd, 1949) (Jurisprudentia, Wtirzburg/Bem, 
2003), also available at <http ://www. oefre.unibe.ch/law/the_basic_law.pdf> (last 
accessed 30 May 2005). 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982 
(Canada Act 1982 (UK), sch B) 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act I 08 of 1996 
Copyright Act 1994 
Domestic Violence Act 1995 
Human Rights Act 1993 
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) 
Interpretation Act 1999 
Limitations Act 1950 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
United States Constitution 
Table of Legislative Materials 
A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper (House of Representatives, 
Wellington, 1985) AJHR - A6 
38 
AS741 
vuw 
A66 
S824 
2005 
-, ,,,r,111ij11,,1r ,,, 1,1,1r, 1,1 ,1 1,1,r ,,r,11 ij1 ,1,1i1 ,i,r, ,,i, ,~,1 r,1,r ,1,, ,,,, . 
3 7212 00869430 7 
